Dispelling the myth of a value premium: contrary evidence of Malaysian crony capitalism by Hudson, Robert. et al.
1 
Dispelling the Myth of a Value Premium: 
Contrary Evidence of Malaysian Crony Capitalism 
 
M. Shahid Ebrahim 
University of Durham, UK 
 
R. Hudson 
University of Hull, UK 
 
Abdullah Iqbal 
University of Kent, UK 
 
M. Eskandar Shah 
INCEIF, Malaysia 
 
This draft: May 25, 2016 
 
Acknowledgements: We thank Obiyathulla Bacha, Weimin Liu, Juliana Malagon, Beat 
Reber, Jo Wells, Huainan Zhao and participants of numerous conferences.  Any remaining 
errors are due to our negligence. 
 
Correspondence Address: Professor M. Shahid Ebrahim 
 Durham University Business School 
 University of Durham 
 Mill Hill Lane 
 Durham DH1 3LB, United Kingdom 
 Tel: +44 (0) 191 334 5405 
 Fax: +44 (0) 191 334 5201 
 E-Mail: m.s.ebrahim@durham.ac.uk 
 
1 
Dispelling the Myth of a Value Premium: 
Contrary Evidence of Malaysian Crony Capitalism 
 
Abstract: 
This paper contradicts the existence of a universal value anomaly by studying Malaysia, a 
country with a unique institutional setting.  We investigate this counter-example to attribute 
the anomaly to: (i) the leverage effect of value firms; (ii) the investment pattern of growth 
firms; and (iii) the economic environment.  We find that the value premium cannot be 
ascribed solely to risk as that it is time varying and dependent on the attributes of the 
companies.  Our results illustrate that small cap value firms perform relatively well during 
favourable economic conditions.  In contrast, large cap growth firms perform better than their 
counterpart (i.e., large cap value firms) in economic upturns as they are preferentially 
awarded projects to revive the nation’s growth.  
 
 
 
JEL Classification: G110 (Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions), G120 (Asset Pricing). 
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 I.  Introduction 
″The principle of empiricism (c) can be fully preserved, since the fate of a theory, its 
acceptance or rejection, is decided by observation and experiment - - by the results 
of tests.  So long as a theory stands up to the severest tests we can design, it is 
accepted; if it does not it is rejected.  But it is never inferred in any sense, from the 
empirical evidence….Only the falsity of a theory can be inferred from empirical 
evidence, and this inference is a purely deductive one.″ (Karl Popper, 1953, pp. 33) 
 
Over the last three decades, an extensive finance literature has documented the value 
premium anomaly.  That is, portfolios of firms, often in the mature sectors of the economy, 
formed on the basis of high book-to-market (BE/ME), cash flow-to-price (C/P) and earnings-
to-price (E/P) ratios have been found to earn significantly higher risk-adjusted returns than 
portfolios with the opposite characteristics.  The evidence for this value premium is so 
evident across the globe that is accepted as an empirical fact.  This is described by Asness et 
al. (2015) as follows: 
“The existence of the value premium is a well-established empirical fact.  It is 
evident in 87 years of U.S. equity data, in more than 30 years of out-of-sample 
evidence from original studies, in 40 countries, in more than a dozen other asset 
classes…and even dating back to Victorian England”   (Asness et al., 2015, p.34). 
 
Fama and French (1998) document the presence of a value premium in twelve of the 
thirteen major markets they study.1, 2  However, despite the compelling evidence of the 
presence of the value premium anomaly, its source remains undetermined. 
                                                          
1 In addition to Fama and French (1998), studies such as Brailsford et al. (2012), Asness et al. (2013), and 
Ebrahim et al. (2014a) also find the value premium in developed markets (such as the Australia, 
Continental Europe, Japan, United Kingdom and United States) and various developing ones (such as 
Brazil, China, India, and Turkey). 
2 The robust empirical findings of the value premium has resulted in a trillion dollar financial services 
industry: (i) segregating exchange traded funds based on this style; and (ii) creating fundamental indices 
with weights based on the different value attributes of firms (see Arnott et al., 2005). 
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 In broad terms, the finance literature suggests four possible explanations for the value 
premium.  First, the rational pricing perspective attributes the outperformance of high BE/ME 
portfolios to an additional risk factor, such as financial distress (Fama and French, 1995).  
Second, a behavioural perspective (see, for example, Lakonishok et al., 1994; and Cronqvist 
et al., forthcoming) asserts that the cognitive/ biological biases of investors may undervalue 
distress stocks and overvalue growth stocks leading to the premium in value stocks.3  Third, 
the value premium is due to the characteristics of a firm that are not related to its risk levels 
(Daniel and Titman, 1997).  Finally, Kothari et al. (1995) and MacKinlay (1995) contest the 
presence of the value premium and claim it is a ‘false’ result caused by methodological issues 
in the studies involved.4  
This study aims to dispel the myth of the value anomaly by employing the logic of the 
well-known Austrian-British philosopher Sir Karl Raimund Popper, who espoused that 
positive outcomes of empirical observation cannot confirm an anomaly, such as a value 
premium (see again Popper, 1953).  However, a single contravening example can trounce it.  
A secondary goal is to advance an ‘economic driver’ of the value premium.  The counter-
example selected in our case is that of the crony capitalism of Malaysia (see Ebrahim et al. 
2014b).  This has attributes that are particularly helpful in gaining a different perspective on 
the value premium debate.  The country is an emerging economy with a top-heavy, closely 
held and state-owned institutional setting described in detail in Section II.b. Our investigation 
covers the period 1992-2012 and includes several distinct sub-periods, one with rapid 
economic growth (1990-1996), followed by one with a severe financial crisis (1997-1998) 
and one with a post-crisis recovery (1999-2007). We also include the sub-prime crisis period 
                                                          
3  The words ‘growth’ and ‘glamour’ have been used interchangeably in the relevant literature. 
4  Kothari et al. (1995) argue that value premium is due to survivorship bias, while MacKinlay (1995) claim 
that it is due to data-snooping. 
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 (2007-2009) and finally the post sub-prime crisis period (2010-2012).  This variety of 
economically different sub-periods is very useful for our analysis. 
Our results initially show that, unusually amongst world markets, a value premium 
generally does not exist in the Malaysian market over our investigation period.  However, we 
do observe a value premium among small firms only during the period of rapid economic 
growth due to leverage effect of equity (Fama and French 1993, 1995, and 1996).  Thus, we 
show that we cannot take a value premium for granted in all economic scenarios.  The 
premium deteriorates to a value ‘discount’, implying a growth premium, in economic 
downturns due to the largess of politicians in awarding projects to government connected 
firms during economic downturns.  These findings indicate interesting avenues for empirical 
analysis for developing hypotheses about the causes of the value premium. 
Our empirical analysis of company characteristics provides much important evidence.  
The well-known Altman (1993) Z-score model in conjunction with the Shumway (2001) 
model, demonstrates that value firms are no more prone to distress than growth ones.  
However, value firms have more leverage than growth firms.   We also observe that the 
coefficients of value and growth portfolios (HML) are sensitive to changes in GDP growth.   
We put forward our hypothesis that our contrary results are attributed to the differing 
financial and investment characteristics of value and growth firms.  The impact of leverage 
on value firms induces their share prices to behave in a volatile way plummeting very fast in 
economic downturns and skyrocketing on upturns.  Pure value stocks constitute shares of 
firms in the mature (or declining) sectors of the economy, with limited (or no) access to 
growth options requiring investments.  Such firms typically have tangible assets in place, 
which are collateralized by debt (see Choi, 2013).  In contrast, pure growth firms operate in 
developing sectors of the economy.  They are endowed with growth options (see Trigeorgis 
and Lambertides, 2014).  Since they have relatively fewer tangible assets, they do not have 
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 much access to debt.  They may be thus compelled to hoard cash and delay exercising growth 
options to mitigate their business risk (see McDonald and Siegel, 1986; and Ingersoll and 
Ross, 1992).  Thus, the relatively muted returns of growth stocks are attributed to their ‘cash-
drag’ during normal times.  However, during economic downturns growing companies 
especially the big ones (with political connections) are given projects to revive growth. This 
financial slack carried by growth firms translates into opportunity to undertake new projects 
and earn premiums during an economic resurgence.  It is this political connection, which 
helps growth firms reap high payoffs for growth firms in the form of a premium over their 
value counterparts.  
Our hypothesis is related to both those of Fama and French (1995) and Daniel and 
Titman (1997), henceforth denoted as FF and DT.  FF demonstrates that growth stocks 
generate lower returns (coefficient of HML) due to their lower distress risk.  However, 
Griffin and Lemmon (2002) claim that distress risk does not contribute to the value premium.  
We extend the latter view point, arguing that both the growth firm’s cash-drag factor, the 
value firm’s unique characteristics and the unique institutional structure of Malaysia needs to 
be taken into consideration.  Our research is influenced by the studies of Chou et al. (2011) 
and Chen et al. (2011), who contrast the performance of the models of FF and DT.  Chou et 
al. (2011) investigates the two models in the context of the Japanese market.  They find the 
choice of the models depends on the duration of the sample, which is consistent with Davis et 
al. (2000).  However, Chen et al. (2011), propose a new three-factor model incorporating 
characteristics similar to that of DT.  They show that their new model goes a long way 
towards explaining many patterns in cross-sectional returns, which the FF model cannot.  We 
extend this research by: (i) illustrating that it is not sample specific (in contrast to Chou et al., 
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 2011); and (ii) employing the rationale of real options, where the investment perspective 
based on Net Present Value, for example, in Chen et al. (2011) fails to hold.5   
Furthermore, DT’s observation of the unique characteristics of firms can be attributed 
to the growth options endowed to growth firms, while FF implies that hoarding of cash by the 
growth firms drags down their returns and considers it as an evidence of distress risk.  Our 
result harmonizes FF with DT in that they both observe the outperformance of value stocks, 
but attribute it to different causes.  The over-reaction hypothesis of De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985, 1987) can be reconciled with the volatile nature of the leveraged equity of value firms 
which resembles a financial option (see Merton, 1974).  This financial option aspect of 
leveraged equity is aggravated in a poor economic environment, leading to a rebound in 
prices with an improving economic environment (see also Choi, 2013; and Lioui and Maio, 
2014).   
In summary, our study contributes to the extant literature as follows.  Firstly, we 
demonstrate that investing in value firms is not a sure-fire approach of ‘beating the market’ 
especially in an institutional setting where the government has stakes in local firms.  
Secondly, we rationalize the differential payoffs of the two types of firms, i.e., value and 
growth by applying firm characteristics and economic fundamentals.   
                                                          
5 Ingersoll and Ross explain this as follows: 
 
“ If in making the investment today we lose the opportunity to take on the same project in the future, 
then the project competes with itself delayed in time. In deciding to take an investment by looking at 
only its NPV, the standard textbook solution tacitly assumes that doing so will in no way affect other 
investment opportunities. Since a project generally competes with itself when delayed, the textbook 
assumption is generally false. Notice, too, that the usual intuition concerning the “time value of 
money” can be quite misleading in such situations. While it is true NPV postponing the project delays 
the receipt of its positive NPV, it is not true that we are better off taking the project now rather than 
delaying it since delaying postpones the investment commitment as well.” 
 
“Of course, with a flat, non-stochastic yield curve we would indeed be better off taking the project 
now, and this sort of paradox could not occur. But that brings up the even more interesting 
phenomenon that is central focus of this article, the effect of interest-rate uncertainty on the timing of 
investment.” (Ingersoll and Ross, 1992, pp. 2) 
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 The rest of the paper is structured as follows:  Section II reviews the relevant literature 
and institutional setting in Malaysia, Section III presents our research questions and outlines 
the methodology used.  Section IV presents the results and analysis, while Section V 
concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review and Institutional Setting 
II.a Literature Review 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965, a and b) and Mossin (1966) shaped the notion of the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by demonstrating that the risk of an asset in terms of 
beta can sufficiently describe the cross-section of expected stock returns.  Since then, a 
number of studies have empirically tested this model using beta as the sole explanatory 
variable with a positive and linear relationship to asset returns.  The results, however, remain 
inconclusive.  Early empirical studies (see, for example, Blume and Friend, 1973) offer 
reasonable support for CAPM.  However, later studies questioned the validity of CAPM 
based on its assumptions and the existence of various anomalies associated with its use (see 
Basu, 1977, 1983; De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; and Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). 
The findings of these latter studies led Fama and French (1992) to conclude that CAPM 
with a single beta does not adequately explain cross sectional differences in stock returns.  
They show that beta has, at best, only a weak relationship with stock returns and that CAPM 
does not price all the risks.  This, in turn, led to the development of their three factor model, 
hereafter the FF model, that consists of: (i) an overall market factor (Rm – Rf); (ii) a size 
premium (SMB), i.e., the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio 
of large stocks; and (iii) a value premium (HML), i.e., the return on a portfolio of value 
stocks (high BE/ME) minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks (low BE/ME); to 
explain the cross-section of returns on US stocks.  Their model is in accord with Merton’s 
(1973) intertemporal CAPM and Ross’s (1976) arbitrage pricing theory (APT), which states 
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 that risks must be multidimensional if stocks are to be priced rationally.  Fama and French 
(1993, 1996) illustrate that there is covariance between SMB and HML and common risk 
factors in returns and that these risk factors contribute significantly in explaining the variation 
in stock returns. 
The FF model has attracted a great deal of attention in academia, which mostly focuses 
on the source of value premium.  Fama and French (1993) and Chen and Zhang (1998) argue 
that value firms are riskier, as they are more likely to be subject to financial distress than 
growth firms, complying with the hypothesis of rational pricing.  In a later paper, Fama and 
French (1995) demonstrate that value [growth] stocks are normally associated with firms that 
have persistently low [strong] earnings growth.  In the light of this evidence, they suggest that 
value [growth] firms have a positive [negative] loading on HML, implying higher [lower] 
distress risk.  Zhang (2005), however, claims that value firms are riskier because they have 
more assets than growth firms.  He conjectures that assets in place are much riskier than 
growth options because in poor economic environments value firms are burdened with more 
unproductive capital and face higher costs in cutting this down.  Much of the recent work on 
the value premium empirically explores how differing states of the world affect the strength 
of the premium.  Stivers and Sun (2010) show that the value premium is countercyclical 
(higher during weaker economic times).  Gulen et al. (2011) show that in times of high 
market volatility the expected excess returns of value stocks are more sensitive than those of 
growth stocks to worsening aggregate economic conditions.  Guo et al. (2009) support the 
view that value is riskier than growth in bad times.  Li et al. (2009) find a positive relation 
between the value premium and its conditional volatility.  In broad terms, the consensus of 
the recent literature is that the value premium is time varying and that value stocks perform 
badly in poor and risky economic environments. 
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 Daniel and Titman (1997) provide an alternative explanation for the value premium.  In 
contrast to Fama and French (1995), they claim that it is firms’ characteristics, rather than 
their covariance of risk factors, that offers an explanation for the value premium.  That is, the 
presence of high covariance between the value stocks is not due to a distress factor but rather 
to their common characteristics.  For instance, value stocks may be characterized by similar 
lines of business or be in comparable industries.  To further corroborate their claim, they 
show that the presence of high covariance between value stocks has no significant 
relationship with the distress factor, i.e., high covariance exists even before the value firms 
become distressed.  Similarly, Lee et al., (2007) find that stock characteristics better explain 
the UK value premium. 
An alternative explanation of the value premium revolves around investor sentiment 
and trading strategies.  Lakonishok et al. (1994) demonstrate that value (i.e., unspectacular) 
firms produce superior returns because of the investors’ overreaction to the past performance 
of firms.  That is, investors extrapolate the past strong [weak] performance of growth [value] 
firms too far into future.  Investors then irrationally overbuy [oversell] growth [value] firms’ 
stocks.  However, when the market realizes that the actual performance for growth [value] 
firms is lower (higher) than initially expected, the growth [value] firm’s stocks end up with 
low [high] returns.6  This finding is similar to the observation of De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 
1987) that poorly performing stocks over the past three-to-five years (i.e., losers) outperform 
prior-period winners during the subsequent three-to-five years.  The above issues are 
reconciled by Lioui and Maio (2014), who attribute the return reversals of stocks to their 
interest rate sensitivity. 
Finally, there is one more potential explanation for the value premium, that is, the 
prevalence of the value premium is due to methodological issues.  Kothari et al. (1995) 
                                                          
6  La Porta et al. (1997) find that value firms have systematically positive earnings surprises and a converse 
effect for glamour firms.  
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 suggest that a selected sample is more likely to include firms that have survived a period of 
distress compared to those that got delisted.  This is commonly known as survivorship bias.  
However, some later studies have refuted these claims (see Chan et al., 1995).  Another view 
put forward by Lo and MacKinlay (1988), MacKinlay (1995) and Conrad et al., (2003) is that 
the value premium is due to data snooping.  That is, continuously testing the same data set 
generally depicts spurious patterns in average returns.  Barber and Lyon (1997) propose that 
using samples from different time periods or different countries alleviate this data-snooping 
hypothesis. 
A number of studies have documented the presence of a value premium in emerging 
markets (see, for example, Geert, 1999; Dewandaru et al., forthcoming), however very few 
investigate its source.  Yen et al., (2004) find that the presence of the value premium in 
Singapore is due to the one-way overreaction of value firms.  Ding et al. (2005) examine 
value and growth portfolios in seven East Asian countries. They find a positive value 
premium for Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore, a negative value premium in 
Thailand and an insignificant effect in Indonesia and Taiwan.  They find that risk and 
liquidity effects are weak in all the countries.  However, firm size and firm growth potential 
effects are significant in most of the countries but the nature of the effects varies considerably 
across countries.  In the case of Malaysia, they find that small value stocks with low growth 
potential have higher returns.  Unfortunately, the data set employed in Ding et al. dates back 
to pre-1997 (i.e. prior to the 1997 Asian financial crisis) and so does not cover the period of 
poor economic conditions.  This is a major issue as most of the recent work on the value 
premium proposes that it changes in an economic downturn.  Given the limited number of 
studies rationalizing the value premium especially in the context of emerging markets, it is 
obvious that many questions surrounding it remain unanswered. 
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 II.b The Unique Institutional Setting of Malaysia  
A number of studies have documented the value premium in both developed as well as 
developing markets as discussed above.  This has led to its acceptance as an empirical fact or 
truth.  This study adopts the Popperian stance by endeavouring to illustrate via the principle 
of falsification that any contradictory instance to a ‘theory’ (or empirical ‘fact’) is sufficient 
to falsify it, regardless of how many positive examples appear to support it.   We hope to 
illustrate the falsification of the value premium by studying an emerging economy (i.e., 
Malaysia) whose unique institutional framework inhibits it (as described below). 
We chose Malaysia for a number of reasons.  First, as a newly industrialized market 
economy, it has experienced a growth pattern that is very different from those of the 
developed economies, especially in our sample period, allowing us to investigate a number of 
economic regimes. For instance, there was a period of remarkable growth around the early 
1990s followed by a severe financial crisis, from mid-1997 to the end of 1998.  In addition, as 
an open economy and trade reliant nation, it is usually highly exposed to the economic health 
of its major trading partners.  This is demonstrated by the impact of the recession in the 
United States (in early 2000), which caused Malaysia to go through a period of sluggish 
economic growth. The recent subprime crisis emanating from the developed economies 
impacted on Malaysia in the real sector (through trade, i.e., exports) as well as the financial 
sector (through linkages of stock exchanges) (Abidin and Rasiah, 2009).7 
Secondly, Malaysia presents an interesting case study because of its interesting 
institutional features and its interest to foreign investors.  The institutional setting of the 
Malaysian market differs from that of the developed markets like the United States, United 
Kingdom, or Japan.  Historically, Malaysian stock market has been top-heavy. The largest 50 
                                                          
7  Overall, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) Composite Index dropped steadily from December 
2007 to October 2008 and by July 2009, the Index bounced back to its January 2007 position (Abidin and 
Rasiah, 2009, Table 15, pp-27). 
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 to 60 stocks by market capitalisation account for most of the traded volume and index 
movement on any given day.  Most of these are also components of the 100 stock Composite 
Index (KLSE CI).  It is these stocks that are considered “investible” by foreign fund 
managers. In addition, Malaysian stocks that are components of international stock indices 
such as the MSCI are also from this category. Since these are the stocks that receive research 
coverage and analysts’ attention, they typically form the bulk of institutional holdings – both 
foreign and local. Given this dichotomous market structure, one could argue that all the smart 
money and institutional holdings are in a small pool of large market capitalisation stocks 
while the retail players are mostly in the smaller/lower priced stocks. Given that our 
definition of size is based on market capitalization, our sample of big stocks would simply 
constitute this pool of 50-60 stocks. When seen in the light of this market microstructure and 
behavioural considerations, like the incentive for professional fund managers to hold index 
linked stocks, our finding that the big stocks outperform, makes eminent sense. 
Furthermore, most of the stocks in the above category are also state owned and closely 
held.  This is because the Malaysian economic system is established on a relationship based 
elitist system (see Gomez and Jomo, 1997).  That is, a system that exhibits political 
patronage, cronyism and low levels of transparency (Johnson and Mitton, 2003).  Fraser et al. 
(2006) find that larger and more profitable Malaysian firms with political patronage carry 
more leverage than firms with less political patronage.  Ebrahim et al. (2014b) investigates 
this issue further to illustrate that the government support of connected firms has waned after 
the Asian crisis.  This has led to a convergence between politically connected firms and 
unconnected firms.  We go beyond Ebrahim et al. (2014b), segregate the growth firms from 
their value counterparts to illustrate the preferential treatment of politically connected growth 
firms over that of value ones especially during economic downturns in Section III.  
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 Our data set illustrates the number of sample firms growing gradually from 24 firms in 
1992 to 676 firms in 2011.  We also use equal-weighted portfolios in our analysis, which 
helps in mitigating the impact of firms with high market capitalisation.   
Malaysia is the only country amongst regional emerging markets to have had capital 
controls for a significant amount of time during our study period.  The volatility of the market 
is low, as compared to other regional markets. Malaysia is also one of the rising emerging 
markets with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita higher than both China and India. 
An explanation for the underperformance [outperformance] of value [growth] stocks is 
deduced from the breakdown of the perfect capital market assumptions inherent in Miller and 
Modigliani (MM-1961) dividend irrelevance theory.8  In the MM framework, a value firm 
(with high BE/ME – book equity to market equity) facing lower growth opportunity is 
deemed to have higher dividend yield.  In contrast, a growth firm has low (or zero) dividend 
yield. In this ideal world, both types of firms should yield similar total returns with value 
stocks bearing lower capital gains whilst growth stocks generate higher capital gains. 
Market imperfections, however, breach the MM theory, shedding light on how this 
leads to outperformance of growth stocks. First, unlike developed markets, dividend yields on 
value stocks in developing markets like Malaysia has traditionally been very low.  This is 
because they are generally politically unconnected firms, depending on their cash flows 
(stemming from their underlying equity capital) to fund their on-going projects, working 
capital outlays and asset obsolescence.  This is illustrated in Footnote 13 (Section III) and is 
in contrast to growth firms, which are predominately politically connected with an easier 
access to government contracts and inexpensive debt capital.  Thus, political connection leads 
to preferential treatment in the awarding of contracts and to a subsidized cost of capital.  This 
                                                          
8  Perfect capital market assumptions entail the following: (a) perfect competition (i.e., economic agents have 
no market power over prices); (b) frictionless markets (i.e., there are no transaction costs or restrictions on 
trade.  Furthermore, all assets are perfectly divisible); (c) homogenous beliefs (i.e., all economic agents 
have homogeneous prior beliefs and receive the same information); and (d) individual rationality (i.e., all 
economic agents are rational expectations utility maximizers).  
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 endows growth companies a comparative advantage over their value counterparts.  This 
preferential status of politically connected growth firms leads investors to prefer them over 
value firms.  The second reason is tax incidence. In Malaysia, capital gains on stocks are not 
taxed whilst dividends are penalized at an effective rate equivalent to the investors’ tax 
bracket. This, ceteris-paribus, results in higher after-tax payoffs for growth stocks in contrast 
to value stocks.  Malaysian institutional factors therefore favour growth firms over value 
ones. 
Thus, in a rapidly developing emerging market such as Malaysia, it is the politically 
connected companies that will be able to piggy-back on rapid economic growth. While value 
stocks would be good ‘defensive’ stocks given their high asset backing, institutional 
investors, particularly foreign ones, would not opt for its defensive stocks, but for growth 
opportunity. Since the foreign institutional investors are the trend setters for local ones, it 
should not be surprising that growth outperforms value as illustrated in Section IV. 
 
III.  Data and Methodology 
Our sample consists of all non-financial firms listed on the three main boards of Bursa 
Malaysia (KLSE) from 1992 to 2011.  We examine the returns from July 1992 to June 2012 
for these firms by employing the relevant data from Datastream.9  The firms included in the 
data fulfil the standard criteria employed in the literature i.e. they all have Datastream stock 
prices for December of year t – 1 and June of year t and Datastream book value for year t – 1.  
In addition, each sample firm has at least two years data on Datastream.10  Table 1 illustrates 
                                                          
9  We use common sample to extract data for all variables. The sample however is only restricted to non-
financial firms.  Note also that the formation of portfolio according to FF requires us to form it using the 
June BE (t) and December ME (t-1).  Thus the final year of the formation of the portfolio is 2011, while 
the data set ends in June 2012. 
10 This criterion is required to address the issue of survival bias documented by Kothari, et al., (1995).  
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 the number of firms belonging to each portfolio by year and the number of firms that are 
politically connected (shown in parentheses). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 reports various characteristics of sample firms (sorted into different portfolios) 
in terms of their political connections. It shows that politically connected firms, on average, 
are significantly larger (Panel A), have higher capital expenditure (Panel B), and rely heavily 
on external financing (Panel C) than their unconnected counterparts, over the full sample and 
two sub-periods (for most of the portfolios). Similarly, firms with political connections have 
higher trading volumes during the full and post-crisis periods. These figures affirm that Bursa 
Malaysia is unique and dominated by top-heavy, closely held, and politically connected 
firms11. Therefore, it is important to investigate the implications of value versus growth 
anomaly in such a market that, potentially, challenges the premise that value always 
outperforms growth.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In order to address our research questions, we employ the standard methodology 
proposed in Fama and French (1993).  First, we form six portfolios by intersecting two 
groups sorted by the size of the firm (ME, stock price times shares outstanding or market 
equity) and three groups sorted by BE/ME (BE, net tangible assets  equity capital plus 
reserves minus intangibles  divided by ME).  This intersection produces following six 
portfolios: SL = small-low value (i.e., small growth); SM = small-middle value; SH = small-
high value; BL = big-low value (i.e., big growth); BM = big-middle value, BH = big-high 
                                                          
11  We use three criteria to classify firms with political patronage.  First, we use the work of Johnston and 
Mitton (2003) and Mitchell and Joseph (2010), which are based on Gomez and Jomo (1997), to identify 
firms with informal political connections.  Second, we include firms which are under the control of 
Khazanah Nasional.  Finally, we incorporate firms under the institutional investors sponsored by the 
Malaysian government (such as Permodalan Nasional Berhad, Tabung Haji and Employee Provident 
Fund).  We use dummy variables to categorize firms with and without political patronage.  
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 value. We use median KLSE size for each year as the threshold point for creating two size 
(ME) groups.  Stocks with ME higher than the median are assigned as Big (B) stocks and 
stocks with lower than median ME are assigned as small (S) stocks.  For BE/ME, we split the 
stocks into three groups based on the breakpoints of bottom 30 percent (Low), middle 40 
percent (Medium), and top 30 percent (High) of the ranked values of BE/ME for KLSE 
stocks.12  Second, we compute the value-weighted monthly returns on the six portfolios from 
July of year t to June of year t + 1, and re-form the portfolios in June of year t + 1.   
To discriminate between value and growth stocks, we employ the above standard 
definition to designate firms with high BE/ME ratio as value stocks and low BE/ME as 
growth stocks. A low BE/ME implies that the market is pricing the firms’ assets (book value) 
at a premium. This price premium reflects the higher growth opportunity that these assets 
offer. 
We also compute the return in five sub-periods to assess the relationship between 
economic cycle and value premium: from July 1992 to June 1997 (high growth period), July 
1997 to June 1999 (Asian financial crisis), July 1999 to June 2007 (post crisis period), July 
2007 to June 2009 (sub-prime crisis) and July 2009 to June 2012 (post sub-prime crisis).13 
We repeat the same process, but this time with twenty-five portfolios based on size (ME) 
intersecting with BE/ME.  This is to check the robustness of the results and to deal with any 
in-sample portfolio issues inherent in the six size-BE/ME portfolios.  The twenty five size-
BE/ME portfolios are constructed using equally-weighted quintile breakpoints for ME and 
BE/ME. 
                                                          
12 We do not use negative BE firms when forming the size-BE/ME portfolios, as they do not have any 
meaningful interpretation. 
 
13 In the overall sample (July 1992 to June 2012), politically connected Big Growth (BL) firms predominate 
over Big Value (BH) firms on all three metrics (such as market capitalization, average yearly capital 
expenditure, average yearly net external financing) as indicated in Table 2 (Panels A-C).  The politically 
connected firms likewise predominate over unconnected firms in terms of average monthly trading 
volumes Table 2 (Panel D).  The situation is reversed in the high growth period (July 1992-June 1997) on 
all metrics (Panels A-D), while reverting to the post-crisis period up to 2012.  
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 To address our second research question on ‘economic drivers’ of the two types of 
firms, our analysis is divided into two phases.  In the first phase, we use measures of 
bankruptcy risk proposed by Altman (1993) to investigate whether firms with a high 
likelihood of distress are also firms with a high book to market ratio (i.e. value firms).14  The 
purpose of this analysis is to examine the relationship between Z-score and BE/ME ratio.  If 
the relationship is negative, both BE/ME and Z-score capture information related to a priced 
distress risk factor.  However, if the relation is positive, then we can conclude that Z-score 
and BE/ME ratio contain different information and that both variables are potentially related 
to differences in relative risk across firms (see Griffin and Lemmon, 2002).  In the context of 
this paper, we argue that the relative risk results from each firm’s unique characteristics. In 
addition to Altman model, we also measure bankruptcy risk using Shumway (2001) model.15 
We form portfolios based on three independent rankings of BE/ME, five rankings on Z-
score, and two rankings of ME (size).16  We only report size-adjusted data, which are the 
simple average of the means of the small and large firm groups.  Firms in the lowest quintile 
of Z-scores are firms with the highest probability of bankruptcy and the probability of 
bankruptcy decreases as we move to the higher quintiles. 
                                                          
14 The finance literature illustrates that the Altman (1993) Z-score model, as described below, can be 
employed to test for countries outside the United States (see again Ebrahim et al. 2014a). 
Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4 X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 1.0X5 
  X1 = Working Capital / Total Assets 
  X2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets 
  X3 = Earnings Before Taxes + Interest / Total Assets 
  X4 = Market value of equity / Total Liabilities 
  X5=   Net Sales / Total Assets 
 
15 The Shumway (2001) study develops a discrete hazard model or a multi-period dynamic logit model.  The 
basic idea behind it stems from survival models employed in the fields of biology and medicine.  Shumway 
(2001) improves upon the traditional approaches of bankruptcy forecasting (such as the Altman model) 
that have generally used accounting ratios.  Shumway (2001) integrates not only financial ratios but also 
market variables, such as market size, ex-post stock returns and idiosyncratic return variability, to derive 
bankruptcy predictors.  
 
16 The break points for BE/ME and size are similar to the formation of six size-BE/ME portfolios. 
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 In the second phase, our main interest is the coefficient of HML, as our objective is to 
show that its value is determined by the risk of a firm’s characteristics rather than distress 
risk.  In pursuit of this objective, we undertake a two-step approach.  First, we employ the 
Fama and French three-factor model [Rpt − Rft = α + b (Rmt − Rft) + s SMB + h HML + ε] to 
determine the coefficient of HML.17  Our preliminary analysis shows that this model is 
adequate to capture portfolio returns in the Malaysian market.18  Tables 3a and 3b show that 
the alphas for all portfolios are insignificant. 
[Insert Tables 3a and 3b about here] 
However, unlike Fama and French (1995), we argue that HML is a proxy for the firm’s 
characteristics and the changes in loading reflect the constant changes in business and 
financial risks.  Therefore, to capture this dynamic attribute, we use rolling beta regressions 
to estimate the time varying coefficient of HML (conditioning beta) rather than conventional 
static analysis.  We regress excess returns of the value and growth portfolios’ using the three 
factor model with a 36-month rolling window.19 
Next, we regress the coefficient of HML (
 
Yit
*) for the ith portfolio on the conditioning 
variable at time t.  We use the mean as the central tendency measure to convert the value of 
coefficients from monthly to annual observations.  This model is described in Equation (1) as 
follows: 
it
J
j
tijitjoit XY εηηβα ∑
=
++++=
1
*  (1) 
where i = 1, … , N;  t = 1, …,T;  j = 1, …., J 
                                                          
17  We use three month Malaysian Treasury Bills (adjusted monthly) rate as a proxy for risk-free rate and 
Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) return as proxy for market return. 
18  Our estimation illustrates that Fama and French (1993) three-factor models have better explanatory power 
than the standard CAPM model.  We also estimate coefficients using Fama-French-Cahart (1997) four-
factor model.  The results, however, are qualitatively similar to those reported using FF three factor model.  
These results are available on request. 
19  We use twenty-five intersecting portfolios rather than six to have a larger number of portfolios. 
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 The model isolates J portfolio specific variables, capturing characteristics, which vary with 
time and across firms (panel data).  The term 
 
εit  signifies the error term assumed to be 
independently and identically normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance.  
That is, 
 
εit ≈ iidN(0,σε
2).  The conditioning variables are the current and two lagged values of 
the change in natural logarithms of total assets and total debt.  The change in natural 
logarithm of total assets measures the sensitivity of undertaking the growth option, while the 
natural logarithm of total debt measures the sensitivity of changing leverage.   In addition, we 
include gross domestic product (GDP) and its two lagged values along with the interaction 
variables to reflect economic conditions at time t.  We also consider a dummy to differentiate 
the coefficients of value and growth firms and interact this dummy with all the variables in 
the panel regression. Finally, we include interaction of change in natural logarithm of total 
assets with GDP and their interaction with the above dummy (along with their lagged values).  
This would allow us to examine if growth firms delay investments. 
We estimate Equation (1) using the static panel data estimation technique.  This is 
partly to address the need for a larger number of data points, as the number of portfolios in 
our sample is quite small.  Static panel data estimation, however, has several other 
advantages.  First, it increases the degrees of freedom and reduces the collinearity problem 
(see Hsiao, 2003).  Second, panel data has the ability to control for the problem of 
endogeneity without the need for an external instrument.   
 
IV.  Empirical Results 
Table 4, Panel A reports average excess returns on six size-BE/ME sorted portfolios for 
the full sample.20  The results show that for the overall period (1992-2012), growth portfolios 
produce higher returns than value portfolios.  The BL portfolio generates returns almost twice 
                                                          
20  It should be noted that our six portfolios are defined as follows: SL = small-low value (i.e., small-growth); 
SM = small-middle value; SH = small-high value; BL = big-low value (i.e., big-growth); BM = big-middle 
value, BH = big-high value. 
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 as large as the BH portfolio.  Overall, these results are opposite to those observed for the 
developed markets where premiums for value firms are generally reported.  Contrarily, we 
find a premium for growth firms and some indication of a premium for large companies.  Our 
findings also illustrate that the value premium is present mainly in stocks of small firms.  
[Insert Table 4 (Panels A to H) about here] 
Further analysis shows that the return pattern varies with the economic cycle.  In the 
high growth period (June 1992 - June 1997), when the Malaysian economy grew at between 
7% and 9% p.a., small value stocks outperformed small growth stocks mainly due to the 
superior performance of the SH portfolio (see Table 4, Panel B).  In each of the subsequent 
sub-periods reported in Panels C to E of Table 4, growth stocks outperformed value stocks.  
Another observation that stands out over both the whole period and the sub-periods outlined 
in Panels B and C of Table 4 is the relatively good performance of BL portfolios. We also 
report value premium (VMG) for the portfolio of all small and big firms separately in Panel 
G, across different sub-periods and find that a significant value premium indeed exist only 
among small firms and the growth premium in big firms for high growth (1992-97) period.  
Table 4, Panel H reports average excess returns on 25 equally-weighted monthly excess 
returns for portfolios sorted on size and value for the full sample.  In broad terms, it confirms 
similar return patterns to those exhibited in Panels A to G (Table 4) with no evidence of a 
significance value premium in portfolios of any size. 
We offer two possible explanations for our findings.  First, the relatively good 
performance of value stocks during high growth periods may be due to leverage effects 
(Fama and French, 1993, 1995, and 1996).  This is simply because leverage increases the 
sensitivity of firm’s net income to any increase in sales.  Referring to Table 5, we find that 
value portfolios have relatively higher leverage than growth portfolios.  This can be seen by 
comparing the H (value) and L (growth) columns in the D/ME sector.  Although not reported 
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 to conserve space, the differences between the numbers in columns are statistically 
significant. Second, to understand our findings of the relatively good performance of the BL 
portfolio, one needs to understand the unique institutional structure of the Malaysian market.  
As discussed earlier, the Malaysian stock market is heavily top weighted.  The top 50 or 60 
stocks by market capitalisation account for most of the traded volume and index movement 
on any given day and are considered “investible” by foreign fund managers.  Malaysian 
stocks that are components of international stock indices such as the MSCI are also from this 
category.  Since these are the stocks that receive research and media coverage and analysts’ 
attention, they typically form the bulk of institutional holdings – both foreign and local. In 
addition, as discussed earlier, one might conjecture that the benefits of political patronage are 
particularly important for larger companies particularly especially during the high growth 
period.21 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 presents summary statistics of the characteristics of the stocks sorted into 
groups by BE/ME and the probability of distress measured by Altman’s Z-score.  Looking at 
all the five quintiles of Z-score, there seems to be no apparent difference between low 
BE/ME and high BE/ME stocks.  For instance, the Z-score in the lowest quintile is 0.476 for 
low BE/ME stocks and 0.586 for high BE/ME stocks.  Moreover, both types of stocks exhibit 
similar scores as we move to the higher quintiles, with the exception of the highest quintile.22  
These findings contradict the hypothesis of Fama and French (1995) that the presence of the 
                                                          
21 Our results from Table 4 basically illustrate that the growth premium exists only during the post crisis sub-
periods.  We attribute this result to the time lag between an investment and its payoffs.  Growth firms 
basically initiate their projects at the instigation of the government stakeholders during a downturn and 
reap their gains at the upturn of the real economy.  This is consistent with fundamentals as the driver for 
stock returns is the expected state of the economy.  In a recession, the future looks bleak as the bulk of 
stock market investors are uncertain on the length of the downturn.  This is why they are always sceptical 
on buying stocks in a recession.  However, an economic upturn is highly rewarding to large growth 
companies in contrast to large value companies as they are preferentially granted projects by their 
benefactor-stakeholder, i.e. the government to revive the underlying real economy. 
22 Our results with the Shumway (2001) model of bankruptcy risk are similar to that of the Altman’s (1993) 
one.  The figures with the Shumway model are not reported for brevity and are available on request. 
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 value premium is due to distress risk.  Furthermore, Table 5 shows that within the high 
BE/ME group, the average return ratio is higher for firms with a higher Z-score than firms 
with a lower Z-score. 
Table 5 also reports summary statistics of market value, total asset, market leverage, 
and profitability for the firms in each portfolio.  This is to further examine our hypothesis that 
Z-score and BE/ME are both related to characteristics that are considered to reflect distress 
risk.  We find a firm’s size to be positively related with BE/ME and Z-score. Our results 
make sense in the context of Malaysia’s economic structure, where most of the big and 
successful firms are either state owned or politically connected.  This is due to the fact that 
these firms have special privileges to capture government-created rents through privatisation, 
licences or contracts (see Ebrahim et al., 2014b).  For instance, Renong Bhd, a company with 
a direct link to the ruling party, emerged as one of Malaysia’s largest conglomerates (see 
Gomez, 1994).  Meanwhile, market leverage is negatively related to Z-score and positively 
related to BE/ME.  High BE/ME firms have higher leverage than low BE/ME in all Z-score 
quintiles.23  Return on Assets (ROA) is positively related to Z-score but there is no 
relationship between BE/ME and ROA.  For example, firms with low BE/ME have similar 
ROA to those with high BE/ME in the fifth quintile of Z-score but lower ROA than those 
with high BE/ME in the second and third quartiles.   
To provide further insights into our argument, we graph the coefficients of HML 
estimated from rolling regressions for four value-weighted portfolios (out of six) and four 
extreme equal-weighted portfolios (from out of 25).24  Figures 1a and 1b, for value-weighted 
and equal-weighted portfolios respectively, exhibit the pattern of time varying coefficients of 
                                                          
23  It should be noted that in the period 1999-2012 small value stocks do have a somewhat higher leverage 
ratio as a proportion of market capitalization than small growth stocks.  However, in monetary terms and in 
comparison to the situation in previous time periods the difference between them is relatively very small.  
In fact in this period, leverage for small companies has been reduced to very low levels compared to the 
preceding periods.  Nonetheless, this discrepancy does not contradict the critical role leverage plays in the 
payoffs of value stocks. 
24  The results of these regressions are not reported here.  They are available on request. 
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 HML for the growth and value portfolios.  We find that the coefficients of HML for value 
portfolios tend to be more stable over time, except during the financial crisis period.  To 
support our graphical illustrations, we provide some simple statistics (mean, standard 
deviation, and t-statistics for difference in mean values) of the HML coefficients of four 
extreme portfolios across five sub-periods in Table 6.  We find the coefficients of HML for 
growth portfolios to be generally higher than value portfolios particularly during crisis period 
and more pronounced for big firms.  We conjecture that the loading of HML for big value 
firms decrease significantly during crisis period due to sensitivity of leverage to economic 
conditions.  They also suffer from the underinvestment issue due to the high agency cost of 
debt.  In contrast, big growth firms, especially those with political connections, have the 
opportunity to undertake projects during crisis period due to their healthy balance sheet 
ensuing from their lack of financial constraints (i.e., debt obligations).  The combination of 
both factors translates into growth premium in the post crisis period.  This is consistent with 
our hypothesis that growth firms mitigate their business risk by exercising their growth 
options in conjunction with the policy makers.  This result, confirming economically 
sensitive HML coefficients, is consistent with Guo et al. (2009), Li et al. (2009), and Gulen et 
al. (2011). 
[Insert Figures 1a and 1b about here] 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Our results support the argument that the leverage undertaken by value firms causes a 
drag on their performance in poor economic environments (see again Choi, 2013).  This is 
especially true as leveraged equity displays the type of volatility associated with financial 
options (see Merton, 1974; Coakley et al., 2014; and Lioui and Maio, 2014).  Improvements 
in the economic outlook cause a bounce-back effect on value stocks.  This outcome, 
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 confirming the characteristics of value versus growth firms, is in harmony with Daniel and 
Titman (1997), Zhang (2005), Choi (2013) and Lioui and Maio (2014).25 
We further test this argument by estimating Equation (1) using the panel data 
estimation technique. In this context a number of studies support the use of measures related 
to value as proxies for future growth options26. We hypothesize that the value portfolios 
should be more sensitive to the natural logarithm of leverage (Fama and French, 1993, 1995, 
and 1996), while growth firms should react to the natural logarithm of total assets.  Table 7 
reports the estimation output for Equation (1).  We find that GDP has a significant positive 
effect on the coefficient of HML.  Moreover, we notice a substantial difference between the 
sensitivity of growth and value portfolios to changes in GDP as shown by the negative values 
of the coefficient of GDP*Dummy (GDP*D).  In the case of growth portfolios, we find that 
the coefficient of HML is sensitive to the GDP growth both at current and lagged levels. In 
contrast, the coefficient of value portfolios is not sensitive to the changes in GDP.  This 
finding further substantiates our intuition that the investment pattern of growth firms depends 
on the GDP growth leading to the changes in coefficient of HML for growth portfolios.  We 
can see that the size of HML is negatively associated at a 10% level of significance with the 
change in assets multiplied by GDP for value companies and hence positively associated with 
the change in assets multiplied by GDP for growth companies as shown by the coefficients of 
∆Total Assets*GDP (∆TA*GDP) and ∆Total Assets*GDP*D (∆TA*GDP*D).  This is 
                                                          
25 In other words, pure value firms comprise of shares of firms in the mature (or declining) sectors of the 
economy, with limited (or no) access to growth options requiring investments.  Pure value firms have 
assets in place which are collateralized by debt.  This makes their shares behave like volatile financial 
options.  In the real world, firms may exhibit hybrid (i.e., value-growth) characteristics, which allow them 
to exhibit cross-sectional variation in their capital structure.  Thus, shares of some value-growth firms may 
undertake lower leverage and illustrate lower swings in their earnings and lower share prices (in contrast to 
pure value firms).  Nonetheless, they do display sensitivity to economic regimes. 
26  A number of studies supports the use of Market-to-Book Equity (MBE) as a proxy for future growth 
options, for example, Smith and Watts (1992) and Adam and Goyal (2008). Although Adam and Goyal 
(2008) suggest that Market-to-Book Assets (MBA) measure is relatively better than other proxies, however 
they find MBE and MBA to be highly correlated. 
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 consistent with the argument in the paper that the growth premium is sensitive to the 
economic environment and the investment pattern of these firms. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
V. Conclusion 
The value anomaly has been accepted as an empirical ‘truth’ as it has been observed in 
many world markets. A number of explanations have been put forward to rationalize the 
source of the premium, but the issue still remains controversial.  In this paper, we reject this 
anomaly by adopting the Popperian philosophy espousing the importance  of contradictory  
examples, i.e. of Malaysia, an emerging economy with a top heavy, closely held, state-owned 
institutional setting and a history of economic volatility.  The initial contribution of this paper 
is to trounce the very idea of a universal value anomaly. Furthermore, given the nature of the 
Malaysian market we are able to undertake substantial additional empirical analysis to gain 
insights into the nature and causes of the value anomaly. 
First, our analysis shows that large growth portfolios outperform large value ones only 
during the high growth (1992-1997) period.  In contrast, small value portfolios outperform 
small growth ones during the same period.  Second, by using the Altman (1993) Z-score and 
the Shumway (2001) model, we find no evidence that value stocks have a greater distress risk 
than growth stocks.  Nevertheless, we find evidence that value firms employ more leverage 
(Fama and French 1993, 1995, and 1996) than growth ones.  This is consistent with Choi 
(2013).  Third, we observe that growth portfolios have lower risk, particularly during the 
crisis and early recovery period.  Our observation is based on the pattern of coefficients 
(HML) generated from rolling regression analyses.  Finally, using panel data analysis, we 
find that the coefficients of HML are sensitive to changes in GDP, reaffirming our intuition 
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 that the risk and return structure of growth firms are determined by their investment pattern 
which mainly depends on the economic cycle. 
These findings lead to the initial contribution of this paper which is to contradict the 
value premium by the interaction between company characteristics, which may be influenced 
by institutional factors, and economic fundamentals.  In particular, we demonstrate that the 
discrepancy of returns occurs for large cap stocks because of the investment pattern of growth 
firms and the leverage of value firms (Fama and French 1993, 1995, and 1996).  That is, 
leverage undertaken by value firms magnifies their return in good economic environments 
but retards their performance in poor ones.  Furthermore, growth firms have a tendency to 
hoard cash and delay exercising their growth options, resulting to a more conservative 
balance sheet.  This mitigates their business risk, but lowers their market valuation, driving 
down their returns in normal times.  However, in the context of Malaysian crony capitalism, 
the financial slack endows them the agility to undertake new projects or investment during 
the crisis period when they coordinate their activities in the real sector of the economy in 
conjunction with the objectives of the policy makers.   
Our paper explains that distress risk is not the main cause for the wide spread in 
expected returns between value and growth stocks, rather it arises due to the risk of the firm’s 
unique characteristics.  To do so, we show that growth firms have the unique characteristic of 
being endowed with growth options, which entail capital outlay resulting in business risk.  In 
contrast, value firms have assets in place which are used as collateral to lever up and boost 
their earnings, resulting in financial risk.  Our explanation is consistent with the views of 
Chen et al. (2011), Choi (2013) and Trigeorgis and Lambertides (2014).  This suggests that 
the interpretation of DT, that risk does not determine expected return, is too strong.  Our 
results are also consistent with Guo et al. (2009), Li et al. (2009), Stivers and Sun (2010), 
Gulen et al. (2011), and Lioui and Maio (2014) in that value premium is time varying and 
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 deteriorates to a value discount (leading to a growth premium) especially for large companies 
in economic upturns. 
Overall, our paper provides further insights into understanding the source of the value 
premium, particularly in the context of emerging markets using Malaysia as a counter 
example.  Testing hypotheses gained from these insights on data from developed markets is 
an issue worthy of further investigation. 
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Table 1: Portfolio composition – number of firms by year and political patronage 
The table reports the number of firms in each portfolio by year. The numbers in parentheses show the 
firms that have politically connection too. Stocks with ME (‘market equity’ or size) below the median 
are deemed ‘small’ whilst stocks with ME above the median are ‘big’.  The breakpoints for BE/ME 
(‘book equity divided by market equity’ or value) are the 30th and 70th percentiles.  The intersection of 
two size-sorted and three value-sorted groups produces six portfolios, named as: SL = small-low value 
(i.e., small-growth); SM = small-middle value; SH = small-high value; BL = big-low value (i.e., big 
growth); BM = big-middle value, BH = big-high value. The last column reports the total number of 
firms in each year. 
Year SL SM SH BL BM BH Total 
1992 5(1) 6(0) 3(3) 4(0) 2(0) 4(2) 24(6) 
1993 5(1) 3(1) 7(4) 8(1) 5(2) 3(1) 31(10) 
1994 3(1) 6(2) 7(4) 11(1) 6(3) 5(2) 38(13) 
1995 8(1) 9(1) 7(2) 12(3) 7(4) 12(4) 55(15) 
1996 8(1) 17(1) 7(0) 13(3) 11(7) 13(5) 69(17) 
1997 7(0) 17(2) 8(1) 16(6) 18(6) 11(5) 77(20) 
1998 14(0) 14(2) 9(2) 17(5) 19(7) 14(6) 87(22) 
1999 8(0) 24(0) 18(4) 28(10) 19(5) 9(5) 106(24) 
2000 30(2) 43(0) 24(2) 27(8) 27(6) 27(10) 178(28) 
2001 29(2) 48(1) 40(0) 40(12) 31(8) 25(9) 213(32) 
2002 34(2) 62(0) 34(1) 43(14) 45(5) 26(10) 244(32) 
2003 38(1) 72(1) 41(6) 57(13) 50(13) 35(8) 293(42) 
2004 42(1) 81(2) 57(7) 70(15) 59(10) 31(12) 340(47) 
2005 58(1) 92(4) 69(5) 81(19) 69(10) 39(14) 408(53) 
2006 65(2) 104(4) 82(3) 91(18) 95(14) 39(16) 476(57) 
2007 68(1) 117(5) 97(8) 110(20) 107(12) 46(13) 545(59) 
2008 68(0) 114(3) 118(8) 119(24) 118(18) 41(10) 578(63) 
2009 60(1) 121(0) 147(9) 139(35) 109(13) 35(6) 611(64) 
2010 70(1) 137(1) 140(9) 140(26) 123(19) 42(11) 652(67) 
2011 65(2) 151(1) 145(7) 155(32) 119(16) 41(9) 676(67) 
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 Table 2: Firm characteristics of politically connected and unconnected firms 
The table provides average monthly market capitalisation (Panel A), average annual capital 
expenditure (Panel B), average annual external financing (Panel C), and average monthly trading 
volume (Panel D), for politically connected and unconnected sample firms over three periods: July 
1992-June 2012 (full sample period), July 1992-June 1997 (pre-crisis period), and July 1999-June 
2012 (post-crisis period). Capital expenditure represents the funds used to acquire fixed assets other 
than those associated with acquisitions. It includes but is not restricted to: additions to property, plant 
and equipment; investments in machinery and equipment. External financing represents financing 
from outside sources. It includes the issuance and retirement of stock and debt. Firms with ME 
(‘market equity/capitalisation’ or size) below the median are deemed ‘small’ whilst stocks with ME 
above the median are ‘big’.  The breakpoints for BE/ME (‘book equity divided by market equity’ or 
value) are the 30th and 70th percentiles.  The intersection of two size-sorted and three value-sorted 
groups produces six portfolios, named as: BH = big-high value; BM = big-middle value; BL = big-
low value; SH = small-high value; SM = small-middle value; SL = small-low value. All figures are in 
thousands. Figures in italics show that politically connected firms are statistically different (within 
period) from unconnected firms at less than 10% levels.  
Panel A: Average monthly market capitalization 
 
July 1992-June 2012 July 1992-June 1997 July 1999-June 2012 
Portfolio 
Politically 
unconnected 
Politically 
connected 
Politically 
unconnected 
Politically 
connected 
Politically 
unconnected 
Politically 
connected 
BH 598,463  990,348  1,475,408  2,361,969  496,793  777,446  
BM 652,181  3,589,859  1,388,960  4,581,481  609,516  2,997,936  
BL 1,923,539  7,025,574  3,477,054  1,690,458  1,851,004  7,177,151  
SH 79,634  290,743  535,309  762,831  63,642  195,452  
SM 70,054  153,521  240,656  305,046  56,043  55,149  
SL 62,241  57,672  284,601  82,727  46,685  49,590  
Panel B: Average yearly capital expenditure 
 
July 1992-June 2012 July 1992-June 1997 July 1999-June 2012 
Portfolio 
Politically 
unconnected 
Politically 
Connected 
Politically 
unconnected 
Politically 
Connected 
Politically 
unconnected 
Politically 
Connected 
BH  44,715   156,950   90,192   645,021   39,973   83,298  
BM  46,382   424,003   49,255   696,900   45,266   321,445  
BL  89,357   637,096   89,915   73,020   88,071   665,136  
SH  9,194   11,963   19,439   16,953   7,870   10,357  
SM  5,582   24,619   14,848   23,903   4,838   6,964  
SL  3,840   7,113   7,345   2,042   3,513   8,698  
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Panel C: Average yearly net external financing (adjusted for debt and stocks retirement) 
 
July 1992-June 2012 July 1992-June 1997 July 1999-June 2012 
Portfolio 
Politically 
unconnected 
Politically 
Connected 
Politically 
unconnected 
Politically 
Connected 
Politically 
unconnected 
Politically 
Connected 
BH  24,705   73,881   110,595   471,179   15,235   7,181  
BM  23,947   162,756   42,318   361,169   22,096   84,015  
BL  48,937   134,788   6,836   89,018   51,865   132,741  
SH  5,865   20,010      59,808   109,976   4,082   57  
SM  2,205   14,436   13,812   45,664   1,259   876  
SL  1,569   −303   14,079   2,139   886   −1,066  
Panel D: Average monthly trading volume 
 
July 1992-June 2012 July 1992-June 1997 July 1999-June 2012 
 
Politically 
unconnected 
Politically 
Connected 
Politically 
unconnected 
Politically 
Connected 
Politically 
unconnected 
Politically 
Connected 
All 
Portfolios          96,527        131,982        295,222           86,783           86,778        132,037  
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 Table 3a: Value weighted monthly excess returns – July 1992 to June 2012 
The table reports coefficients of CAPM, Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model returns using monthly excess returns, in percent, for portfolios sorted on size 
and value over the period July 1992 to June 2012 (240 monthly returns).  Stocks with ME (‘market 
equity’ or size) below the median are deemed ‘small’ whilst stocks with ME above the median are 
‘big’.  The breakpoints for BE/ME (‘book equity divided by market equity’ or value) are the 30th and 
70th percentiles.  The intersection of two size-sorted and three value-sorted groups produces six 
portfolios: SL = small-low value; SM = small-middle value; SH = small-high value; BL = big-low 
value; BM = big-middle value, BH = big-high value.  We estimate coefficients for six portfolios using 
CAPM, Fama and French (1993) three factor, and Fama-French-Carhart (1997) four factor models, as 
follows:  
 
 
 
Here, Rpt and Rft are the returns on a market portfolio and risk free asset. RMRF, SMB, and HML are 
constructed as in Fama and French (1993) and PR1YR as in Carhart (1997).  We use three month 
Malaysian Treasury Bills (adjusted monthly) rate as a proxy for risk-free rate and Kuala Lumpur 
Composite Index (KLCI) return as proxy for market return.  Superscripts x, y, and z show that the 
coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels. 
Portfolio Method α B S h m 
SL 
CAPM 0.706 1.157 x 
   F-F 0.220 0.456 x 0.400 x −0.571 x 
 F-F-C 0.263 0.421 x 0.397 x −0.568 x −0.323 z 
SM 
CAPM 0.654 1.342 x 
   F-F 0.003 0.603 x 0.624 x −0.617 x 
 F-F-C 0.068 0.551 x 0.619 x −0.613 x −0.480 x 
SH 
CAPM 0.722 1.202 x 
   F-F −0.321 0.008 x 0.996 x −0.996 x 
 F-F-C −0.321 0.008 x 0.996 x −0.996 x 0.001 
BL 
CAPM 1.267 1.289 x 
   F-F 0.641 0.557 x 0.592 x −0.609 x 
 F-F-C 0.683 0.523 x 0.589 x −0.607 x −0.313 
BM 
CAPM 1.362 1.058 x 
   F-F 0.220 0.456 x 1.400 x −0.571 x 
 F-F-C 0.263 0.421 x 1.397 x −0.568 x −0.323 z 
BH 
CAPM 0.511 1.094 x 
   F-F 0.104 0.606 x 0.378 x −0.404 x 
 F-F-C 0.155 0.566 x 0.375 x  −0.401 x −0.379 y 
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 Table 3b: Equal-weighted monthly excess returns – July 1992 to June 2012 
The table reports coefficients of CAPM and FF three-factor model for 25 equally-weighted portfolios 
by intersecting ME (‘market equity’ or size) and BE/ME (‘book equity divided by market equity’ or 
value) using quintile breakpoints.  For example, S1L1 refers to the smallest quintiles (bottom 20%) in 
size (ME) and value (BE/ME).  The coefficients are generated using CAPM and Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor models, as noted in Table 2a.  We also estimate coefficients using Fama-French-
Carhart (1997) four-factor model but do not report to conserve space, as the results stay qualitatively 
similar to those reported using F-F three-factor model.  Superscripts x, y, and z show that the 
coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels. 
 CAPM  F-F 
  Value (BE/ME)                                   Value (BE/ME) 
 
L1 L2 L3 L4 L5   L1  L2 L3 L4 L5 
Size 
(ME)   α      α   
S1 1.504 0.808 0.371 0.447 1.074  1.334 0.087 -0.074 0.497 0.033 
S2 0.793 -0.043 0.321 1.100 0.727  -0.031 -0.414 -0.296 0.245 0.450 
S3 0.679 0.935 0.816 1.448 0.314  0.497 0.370 0.332 0.747 -0.084 
S4 0.066 1.288 0.500 0.362 0.548 
 
-0.515 1.013 -0.064 -0.025 0.183 
S5 0.595 0.239 0.348 0.010 0.994 
 
0.017 -0.168 0.147 -0.285 0.568 
 
B 
 
B 
S1 1.162 x 1.211 x 1.299 x 1.230 x 1.425 x 
 
0.475 y 0.323 y 0.423 x 0.234 z 0.174 
S2 1.531 x 1.380 x 1.439 x 1.278 x 1.244 x 
 
0.511 z 0.520 x 0.731 x 0.373 x 0.031 
S3 0.932 x 0.928 x 1.237 x 1.221 x 0.897 x 
 
0.203  0.267  0.545 x 0.425 y 0.317 y 
S4 1.360 x 1.241 x 1.057 x 0.968 x 0.943 x 
 
0.687 x 0.304 z 0.446 x 0.490 x 0.519 x 
S5 1.291 x 1.018 x 1.162 x 1.123 x 0.980 x 
 
0.612 x 0.596 x 0.433 x 0.690 x 0.320 y 
       
S 
S1 
      
0.441 x 0.660 x 0.761 x 0.894 x 0.968 x 
S2 
      
0.694 x 0.640 x 0.589 x 0.753 x 1.118 x 
S3 
      
0.572 x 0.534 x 0.578 x 0.672 x 0.470 x 
S4 
      
0.551 x 0.828 x 0.554 x 0.355 x 0.347 x 
S5 
      
0.544 x 0.362 x 0.714 x 0.349 x 0.662 x 
       
H 
S1 
      
-0.610 x -0.735 x -0.802 x -0.924 x -1.037 x 
S2 
      
-0.765 x -0.711 x -0.590 x -0.754 x -1.129 x 
S3 
      
-0.660 x -0.551 x -0.575 x -0.665 x -0.481 x 
S4 
      
-0.560 x -0.857 x -0.513 x -0.395 x -0.353 x 
S5 
      
-0.565 x -0.353 x -0.682 x -0.358 x -0.687 x 
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 Table 4: Summary statistics of monthly excess returns 
Panel A of the table reports actual mean return values and t-statistics (in parentheses) of value-
weighted monthly excess returns (RPTRFT) in percent for portfolios sorted on size and value over the 
period July 1992 to June 2012 (i.e. 240 monthly returns).  Stocks with ME (‘market equity’ or size) 
below the median are deemed ‘small’ whilst stocks with ME above the median are ‘big’.  The 
breakpoints for BE/ME (‘book equity divided by market equity’ or value) are the 30th and 70th 
percentiles.  The intersection produces six portfolios: SL = small-low value; SM = small-middle 
value; SH = small-high value; BL = big-low value; BM = big-middle value, BH = big-high value; 
VMG = value minus growth and is given by [{(S/H+B/H)/2} – {(S/L+B/L)/2}]; and RPTRFT = 
return on portfolio minus the risk free rate.  We report one sided t-statistics: H0 = 0 and H1 > 0 in 
parentheses.  Panels B to F report these values for value-weighted monthly excess returns for the 
following sub-periods: Panel B high growth from July 1992 to June 1997; Panel C Asian financial 
crisis from July 1997 to June 1999; Panel D post-Asian financial crisis from July 1999 to June 2007; 
Panel E sub-prime crisis from July 2007 to June 2009; and Panel F post-subprime crisis from July 
2009 to June 2012. Finally, Panel G reports mean and t-statistics for equally-weighted monthly excess 
returns (please see details with the panel) for the full sample period from July 1992 to June 2012. 
Superscripts x, y, and z show that the coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels. 
 
Panel A: Full sample period July 1992 – June 2012  
 
Portfolio RPTRFT Portfolio RPTRFT 
    
SL 1.061z 
(1.363) 
BL 1.663 y 
(1.788) 
SM 
 
1.065 
(1.378) 
BM    1.686 z  
   (1.475) 
SH 1.091z 
(1.476) 
BH     0.846 y  
 (1.334) 
VMG  −0.393 
(−0.925) 
  
 
Panel B: High growth subperiod – July 1992 to June 1997 
 
Portfolio RPTRFT Portfolio RPTRFT 
    
SL 1.827 z 
(1.535) 
BL 4.534 y 
(2.259) 
SM 
 
3.441 y 
 (2.348)  
BM    1.979 z  
   (1.545) 
SH 5.030 x 
 (2.778) 
BH     2.122 y  
 (2.007) 
VMG      0.395 
(0.337) 
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 Panel C: Asian Financial crisis subperiod – July 1997 to June 1999 
 
Portfolio RPTRFT Portfolio RPTRFT 
    
SL −2.019 
(−0.494) 
BL 2.285 
(0.344) 
SM 
 
−1.254 
(−0.216) 
BM 0.036 
(0.007) 
SH −2.539 
(−0.604) 
BH −1.40 
(−0.350) 
VMG  −0.210 
(−1.037) 
  
Panel D: Post Asian financial crisis subperiod– July 1999 to June 2007  
 
Portfolio RPTRFT Portfolio RPTRFT 
    
SL 1.144 
(0.886) 
BL 0.566 
(0.604) 
SM 
 
0.598 
(0.756) 
BM    0.415 
   (0.332) 
SH −0.172 
(−0.200) 
BH     0.925 
 (0.145) 
VMG  −0.479 
(−0.979) 
  
Panel E: Sub-prime crisis subperiod – July 2007 to June 2009  
 
Portfolio RPTRFT Portfolio RPTRFT 
    
SL −0.386 
(−0.242) 
BL −0.758 
(−0.504) 
SM 
 
−0.561 
 (−0.394) 
BM 8.131 
(0.895) 
SH −0.690 
 (−0.607) 
BH −0.983 
(−0.532) 
VMG     −0.265 
  (−0.523) 
  
Panel F: Post sub-prime crisis subperiod– July 2009 to June 2012  
 
Portfolio RPTRFT Portfolio RPTRFT 
    
SL 2.576 x 
(1.551) 
BL 1.001 
(1.194) 
SM 
 
0.983 
(0.109) 
BM    1.393 z 
   (1.562) 
SH 1.498 x 
(1.658) 
BH     1.226 
 (1.229) 
VMG  −0.426 
 (−0.538) 
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Panel G: Value-minus-growth (VMG) statistics for portfolios of small and big firms 
 
Portfolio of small firms Portfolio of big firms 
 Mean values Mean values 
Full sample period 92-12 0.0301 −0.8165 z 
High growth period 92-97 3.2025 y −2.4113 z 
Asian financial crisis 97-99 −0.5198 −3.6835 
Post Asian crisis 99-07 −1.3165 0.3588 
Sub-prime crisis 07-09 −0.3049 −0.2252 
Post sub-prime crisis 09-12 −1.0764 0.2248 
 
 
Panel H: Equal-weighted monthly excess returns for full sample period – July 1992 to June 
2012  
 
This panel reports actual mean return values and t-statistics of equally-weighted monthly excess 
returns (RPTRFT) in percent for portfolios sorted on size and value over the period July 1992 to June 
2012 (i.e. 240 monthly returns). We construct 25 equally-weighted portfolios by intersecting ME 
(‘market equity’ or size) and BE/ME (‘book equity divided by market equity’ or value) using quintile 
breakpoints.  For example, S1L1 refers to the smallest quintiles (bottom 20%) in size (ME) and value 
(BE/ME). RPTRFT is return on equally-weighted portfolio minus the risk free rate. We report one 
sided t-statistics: H0 = 0 and H1 > 0. The last column reports difference in mean values of two extreme 
quintiles (L1 & L5) by BE/ME. Superscripts x, y, and z show that the values are significant at the 1%, 
5%, or 10% levels. 
 
Value (BE/ME) 
 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 
Difference 
in Mean 
L5 & L1 
Size (ME) RPTRFT 
S1 1.659 z 1.179 z 0.612 0.604 1.511 z −0.148 
S2 0.790 0.341 0.763 1.510 y 0.961 0.171 
S3 0.799 1.220 z 1.136 z 1.823 z 0.546 −0.253 
S4 0.483 1.447 z 0.825 0.659 0.838 z 0.354 
S5 0.991 0.565 0.567 0.301 1.551 z 0.559 
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 Table 5:  Firm characteristics for portfolios sorted on distress probability and value 
 
The table reports different firm characteristics of 15 portfolios. These portfolios are formed by 
intersecting three breakpoints (bottom 30%, L; middle 40%, M; and highest 30%, H) for BE/ME 
(‘book equity divided by market equity’ or value) and five quintiles of bankruptcy risk (z-score). 
Bankruptcy risk (z-score) is estimated using Altman (1993) model. Firms in the lowest quintile of z-
scores are firms with the highest probability of bankruptcy risk i.e. quintile 1 has the highest risk of 
default and quintile 5 has lowest such risk. Firm characteristics reported here are: ROA (return on 
assets); ME (market equity); D/ME (debt/market equity); RTN (average yearly return); and TA (total 
assets). Portfolios are formed in June of every year from July 1992 to 2011.  
 
 
Portfolios 
  
Portfolios 
 
L M H 
  
L M H 
Z-score 
quintiles Z-score  
Z-score 
quintiles ROA (return on assets) 
1 0.476 0.683 0.586 
 
1 −0.114 −0.050 −0.032 
2 1.476 1.498 1.460 
 
2 −0.019 0.006 0.022 
3 2.179 2.266 2.197 
 
3 0.004 0.034 0.046 
4 3.321 3.280 3.199 
 
4 0.025 0.058 0.061 
5 6.599 5.896 5.736 
 
5 0.090 0.089 0.091 
ME (market value of equity)  D/ME (debt/market equity) 
1 1661590 636197 301589 
 
1 3.271 3.187 4.456 
2 1560913 361006 261784 
 
2 1.440 1.689 2.106 
3 2291833 590521 248664 
 
3 0.793 1.043 1.358 
4 2486692 544191 256738 
 
4 0.446 0.567 0.806 
5 2909061 678844 513712 
 
5 0.174 0.213 0.279 
RTN (average yearly return)  TA (total assets) 
1 1.083 1.185 1.175 
 
1 4026075 2063065 1709924 
2 1.332 1.198 0.914 
 
2 2487058 784488 787148 
3 1.381 1.059 1.335 
 
3 2621014 795312 484779 
4 1.295 1.217 1.558 
 
4 1975051 654470 451933 
5 1.530 1.189 0.873 
 
5 1429766 620821 589885 
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 Table 6: Selective descriptive statistics of HML loadings across different sub-periods 
The table reports mean, standard deviation, and different in mean (D.i.M) values of HML loadings for 
four value-weighted and four equally-weighted portfolios, across five sub-periods namely high 
growth period from July 1992 to June 1997; Asian financial crisis period from July 1997 to June 
1999; post-Asian financial crisis from July 1999 to June 2007; sub-prime crisis from July 2007 to 
June 2009; and post-subprime crisis from July 2009 to June 2012. Initially, six value-weighted 
portfolios are created as follows: stocks with ME (‘market equity’ or size) below the median are 
deemed ‘small’ whilst stocks with ME above the median are termed ‘big’.  The breakpoints for 
BE/ME (‘book equity divided by market equity’ or value) are the 30th and 70th percentiles. The 
intersection of two size-sorted and three value-sorted groups produces six value-weighted portfolios, 
named as: BH = big-high value; BM = big-middle value; BL = big-low value; SH = small-high value; 
SM = small-middle value; SL = small-low value. The descriptive statistics are report only for BL, BH, 
SL and SH portfolios. In addition, 25 equally-weighted portfolios are created by intersecting ME 
(‘market equity’ or size) and BE/ME (‘book equity divided by market equity’ or value) using quintile 
breakpoints.  For example, S1L1 refers to the smallest quintile (bottom 20%) in size (ME) and value 
(BE/ME) and so on. The descriptive statistics are reported only for four portfolios: S1L1 (small-
lowest value); S1L5 (small-highest value); S5L1 (big-lowest value); and S5L5 (big-highest value) 
portfolios. D.i.M values in italics show that they are statistically significant at less than 1% level. 
  Value-weighted portfolios Equal-weighted portfolios 
  BL BH SL SH S1L1 S1L5 S5L1 S5L5 
High 
Growth 
Period 
(1992-97) 
Mean 0.350 −0.131 −0.167 −0.998 0.087 −0.755 −0.239 −0.128 
St Dev 0.100 0.108 0.052 0.001 0.307 0.325 0.202 0.434 
D.i.M.  
value 
0.4810 0.8307 0.8424 −0.1107 
Asian 
Financial 
crisis 
(1997-99) 
Mean 0.437 −0.436 −0.375 −1.001 −0.479 −0.784 −0.901 −0.428 
St Dev 0.051 0.114 0.099 0.002 0.219 0.204 0.268 0.346 
D.i.M.  
value 
0.8728 0.6880 0.3044 −0.4728 
Post 
Asian 
crisis 
(1999-07) 
Mean 0.255 −0.555 −0.437 −1.002 −0.657 −1.109 −0.928 −0.963 
St Dev 0.200 0.219 0.177 0.003 0.312 0.108 0.166 0.286 
D.i.M.  
value 
0.8103 0.7193 0.4525 0.0346 
Sub-
prime 
crisis 
(2007-09) 
Mean 0.150 −0.533 −0.611 −0.999 −1.282 −1.043 −1.036 −1.201 
St Dev 0.166 0.169 0.166 0.002 0.201 0.103 0.078 0.262 
D.i.M.  
value 
0.6832 0.8051 −0.2392 0.1646 
Post sub-
prime 
crisis 
(2009-12) 
Mean 0.033 −0.098 −0.427 −1.001 −1.392 −0.977 −0.912 −0.542 
St Dev 0.014 0.066 0.155 0.001 0.615 0.088 0.084 0.134 
D.i.M.  
value 
0.1319 0.7139 −0.4144 −0.3699 
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 Table 7: Random effects regression of the sensitivity of HML portfolio 
HML (high minus low) is the difference between the simple average of returns on two high value 
portfolios (S/H, B/H) and returns on two low value portfolios (S/L, B/L), as in Fama and French 
(1993).  We calculated HML for 20 portfolios sorted on ME (‘market equity’ or size) and BE/ME 
(‘book equity divided by market equity’ or value) using quintile breakpoints, and is recalculated when 
the portfolios are rebalanced every year in June.  We use a random-effects regression to estimate the 
following model:  
 
 
Where TA is change in natural logarithm of total assets; TL is natural logarithm of total leverage; 
GDP is gross domestic product; D is a dummy variable taking the value of unity if the portfolio is 
‘value’ and 0 otherwise and is interacted with TA, TL, GDP, and TA*GDP, respectively; subscripts 
i and t represent ith portfolio at time t; and t–1 and t–2 represent the lagged value of the variables; ηi is 
an unobserved portfolio-specific effect and ηt captures common period-specific effects; εit is an error 
term, which represents measurement errors and other explanatory variables that have been omitted 
and is assumed to be independently identical normally distributed with zero mean and constant 
variance. The columns report coefficients, t-statistics, and p-values.  
 
Dependent Variable: HML    
Independent variables Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Constant −0.7711 −2.06 0.039 
∆Total Assets (∆TA) −0.0388 −0.39 0.698 
∆Total Assetst – 1  −0.1174 −1.22 0.222 
∆Total Assetst – 2  0.0161 0.51 0.607 
∆Total Assets*Dummy (∆TA*D)  0.0429 0.28 0.778 
∆Total Assets*Dummy t – 1 0.1557 1.03 0.303 
∆Total Assets*Dummy t – 2 0.0096 0.14 0.887 
Total Leverage (TL) 0.0399 0.44 0.663 
Total Leverage t – 1 0.0780 0.90 0.369 
Total Leverage t – 2 −0.1389 −1.57 0.116 
Total Leverage*Dummy (TL*D) 0.0268 0.21 0.832 
Total Leverage *Dummy t – 1 −0.1595 −1.28 0.202 
Total Leverage *Dummy t – 2 0.1417 1.16 0.245 
GDP (GDP) 0.0162 2.29 0.022 
GDP t – 1 0.0101 1.66 0.097 
GDP t – 2 0.0123 1.72 0.085 
GDP*Dummy (GDP*D) −0.0147 −1.49 0.136 
GDP*Dummy t – 1 −0.0010 −0.12 0.904 
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 GDP*Dummy t – 2 −0.0015 −0.15 0.880 
∆Total Assets*GDP (∆TA*GDP) 0.0019 0.42 0.672 
∆Total Assets*GDPt – 1  −0.0006 −0.16 0.875 
∆Total Assets*GDPt – 2  −0.0018 −0.46 0.647 
∆Total Assets*GDP*D (∆TA*GDP*D) −0.0165 −1.88 0.060 
∆Total Assets*GDP*Dt – 1  −0.0014 −0.17 0.867 
∆Total Assets*GDP*Dt – 2  −0.0017 −0.20 0.843 
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 Figure 1a: Patterns of HML for value-weighted portfolios 
The figure plots the pattern of time varying coefficients of HML for four portfolios out of six value-
weighted portfolios, which are constructed using two ME (‘market equity’ or size) and three BE/ME 
(‘book equity divided by market equity’ or value) intersection points.  The figures are for large ME-
low BE/ME (Large Growth) and large ME-high BE/ME (Large Value); small ME-high BE/ME 
(Small Growth) and small ME-high BE/ME (Small Value) portfolios. 
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 Figure 1b: Patterns of HML for equal-weighted portfolios 
The figure plots the pattern of time varying coefficients of HML for four extreme portfolios out of 25 
equal-weighted portfolios, which are constructed using five ME (‘market equity’ or size) and five 
BE/ME (‘book equity divided by market equity’ or value) quintile intersection points.  The figures are 
for the largest ME-lowest BE/ME (Largest Highest Growth) and the largest ME-lowest BE/ME 
(Largest Highest Value); the smallest ME-lowest BE/ME (Smallest Highest Growth) and the smallest 
ME-highest BE/ME (Smallest Highest Value) portfolios.  
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